By David Neal.
As part of our ongoing series on the 2025 Defence Capability Plan, this article examines the proposed upgrades to the New Zealand Light Armoured Vehicle (NZLAV) fleet. According to the plan, these upgrades are necessary in order to “ensure NZDF personnel can continue to safely and effectively manoeuvre and fight on the modern battlefield.” (New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 29). While these upgrades appear to achieve part of that aim, the NZLAV is not sufficient for a modern fighting force.
First, what is an NZLAV? The New Zealand Light Armoured Vehicle, is the version of the Canadian Light Armoured Vehicle III, LAV III, operated by the New Zealand Army. NZLAV mounts a 25mm autocannon, sufficient armour for protection from small arms and shrapnel, and carrying 3 crew, plus 7 infantry (New Zealand Defence Force, 2003). It is intended as a light, mobile vehicle capable of also providing supporting fire for the infantry it carries. Initially ordered in the early 2000’s, the NZLAV was expected to remain in service for 25 years (Burton, 2000). We are fast reaching the end of that 25 year period. So, does the upgrade program achieve its set aims, or is the NZLAV in dire need of total replacement?
While recent months have seen other LAV III variants, such as the American Stryker IFV, perform reasonably well in combat in Ukraine (Mukhina, 2025), it is important to note that the NZLAV and the Stryker are designed for distinct roles. The Stryker is a vehicle designed to get in fast, deploy infantry, and then get out even faster. As stated by Vladyslav, a battalion representative for the Ukrainian 81st Separate Airmobile Brigade, “[a] fight should last 5, maybe 10 minutes. If it goes 30, you’re under artillery, FPVs, and drones. If the assault is spotted early, it becomes a one-way mission” (Mukhina, 2025).
LAV III variants, including both NZLAV and Stryker, share a level of armour called Standardisation Agreement III, STANAG III, and can be fitted with appliqué armour to the next level, STANAG IV. At this higher level, this means they will survive small arms fire and sometimes higher caliber autocannon rounds (Mukhina, 2025). Stryker is explicitly not suitable for combat against mechanised infantry or tanks, per US Army Maj. Walter Gray II, due to its inadequate armour and weaponry (Axe, 2024). This may be less of a problem for NZLAV, due to the 25mm autocannon, which has been able, in ideal circumstances, to defeat the armour of a T-90 main battle tank (Tuzov, 2024). Despite this, it remains the case that the NZLAV does not carry dedicated anti-tank weapons, such as the TOW missile mounted on M2 Bradley IFVs, or the Malyutka missile mounted to Soviet or Chinese designed IFVs. This difficulty in dealing with armoured vehicles puts NZLAV at a disadvantage if it is intended to be used as the sole fire support vehicle for the New Zealand Army.
Thus, the NZLAV may be adequate for certain aspects of its intended role within the New Zealand Defence Force, but it may be insufficient for the challenges of modern warfare. A revolution is unfolding in military affairs, driven by the large-scale use of drone systems on the modern battlefield. Military analysts have likened this with the introduction of gunpowder weapons (Nielsen, 2025). In terms of its speed and immediate effect on the battlefield, it can be compared to the development of tanks in the First World War.
The Lancet 3 drone, with a range of approximately 40 km, a 3kg payload designed to destroy a tank, and a top speed of 110km/h, poses a significant threat to armored vehicles such as the NZLAV (Borsari, 2025). FPV drones can carry RPG warheads and similar anti-armour weapons, and can be made immune to jamming, one of the traditional defences against drones (Kirichenko, 2025). Both kinds of systems are capable of destroying an NZLAV, regardless of appliqué armour. These emerging threats are outside the scope of what the NZLAV was designed to defeat. If we intend to maintain NZLAV in service, a method of defeating drones must be implemented.
A variety of anti-drone weapons are currently in use, and it remains unclear which will be the most effective solution. Some of these methods are extremely high tech, such as vehicle mounted anti-air lasers, which were demonstrated last month and are currently in operation with the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Litnarovych, 2025; Reporting from Ukraine, 2025). Others are unconventional in their simplicity, such as trucks mounting the nearly century-old M2 Browning heavy machine gun (Epstein, 2025). More common than the former, and more effective than the latter, are systems such as the German Flakpanzer Gepard, capable of locking onto targets as small as birds at distances of up to 14 km, and engaging them with twin 35mm autocannon.
While lasers hold significant promise as close-in weapon systems – particularly for warships and land-based applications – they are likely well beyond the New Zealand Defence Force’s budgetary constraints. On the other hand, trucks mounting heavy machine guns are an extremely affordable option, although they come with substantial limitations. These systems lack protection, and without their own radar, are not going to be engaging anything much at the scale of an FPV drone at any distance.
Ultimately, we are left with a problem. Self-propelled air defence systems (SPADs), such as Gepard, are usually built onto tank hulls and are a costly investment. While experiments with air defence variants of LAV II were undertaken (LAV-AD, 2001), there was no similar program for LAV III. This makes it impossible to buy off-the-rack air defence systems to fit on current NZDF combat vehicles. Canada appears to have been experimenting with LAV VI based short range air-defence, which may prove a useful answer, as LAV VI shares the same hull as NZLAV (LAV 6.0, 2024). This would not be a short term solution, however, as the product does not currently exist to purchase.Available now is the Australian designed Slinger air defence system, a radar guided autocannon designed to be fitted to light vehicles (Defense Express, 2023). As Slinger is an Australian design, with American parts, the system would also improve interoperability with our Five Eyes allies (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).
In short, the NZLAV is still an effective vehicle for its intended role, but is inadequate on its own to deal with new threats it was never designed for. There are, however, readily available solutions for the most pressing concerns which, if accepted, would allow the NZLAV to continue in service for years to come.
References
Axe, D. (2023). Ukraine’s 50-Year-Old Gepards Are Still The Best Air-Defense Guns In the World. Forbes https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/09/08/ukraines-nearly-50-year-old-gepards-are-still-the-best-air-defense-guns-in-the-world/
Axe, D. (2024). In Vovchansk, Ukrainian Paratroopers in Stryker Vehicles Are Fighting Russian Infantry Attacking From All Directions. Forbes https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/05/23/in-vovchansk-ukrainian-patroopers-in-stryker-vehicles-are-fighting-russian-infantry-attacking-from-all-directions/
Borsari, F. (2025) Adaptation Under Fire: Russia’s Kill Chain in Ukraine. Center for European Policy Analysis. https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/adaptation-under-fire-mass-speed-and-accuracy-transform-russias-kill-chain-in-ukraine/
Burton, M. (2000). Rebuilding the Capability of the New Zealand Defence Force 6/6. Beehive.govt.nz https://www.beehive.govt.nz/feature/rebuilding-capability-new-zealand-defence-force-66
Defense Express (2023). Ukraine Gets Unique Slinger Anti-Drone Weapon Station From Australian EOS. Defense Express. https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/ukraine_gets_unique_slinger_anti_drone_weapon_station_from_australian_eos-7818.html
Epstein, J (2025). Inside Ukraine’s Fight: Shooting Drones With M2 Browning Machine Guns. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/how-ukraine-fights-russian-drones-with-truck-mounted-machine-gun-2025-3
Kirichenko, D. (2025). A New and More Deadly Drone on Russia’s Battlefields. Center for European Policy Analysis. https://cepa.org/article/a-new-and-more-deadly-drone-on-russias-battlefields/
LAV-AD (2001). Army Technology https://www.army-technology.com/projects/blazer/?cf-view
LAV 6.0 (2024). General Dynamics Land Systems https://www.gdls.com/lav-6-0/
Litnarovych, V (2025) Exclusive Footage: Ukraine’s Secret Laser Shreds Drones in Seconds. UNITED24 Media. https://united24media.com/latest-news/exclusive-footage-ukraines-trident-laser-shreds-drones-in-seconds-6730
Mukhina, O. (2025). Ukrainian paratroopers deploy battle-tested Stryker APCs to eastern front after Kursk success. Euromaidan Press https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/04/10/ukrainian-paratroopers-deploy-battle-tested-stryker-apcs-to-eastern-front-after-kursk-success/
New Zealand Defence Force (2003). NZLAV – The Future of the NZ Army. Scoop. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0310/S00197/nzlav-the-future-nz-army.htm
New Zealand Ministry of Defence. (2025). 2025 Defence Capability Plan. New Zealand Government. https://www.defence.govt.nz/publications/2025-defence-capability-plan/
Nielsen, A. P. (2025). NATO has missed the drone revolution. Logic of War. https://www.logicofwar.com/nato-has-missed-the-drone-revolution/
Reporting From Ukraine (2025). Frontline report: Ukraine’s sci-fi laser weapon Tryzub blinds Russian pilots and melts drones mid-air https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/04/19/frontline-report-ukraines-sci-fi-laser-weapon-tryzub-blinds-russian-pilots-and-melts-drones-mid-air/Tuzov, B. (2024). ANALYSIS: How Ukraine’s M2 Bradleys Take Out Russia’s Best T-90 Tanks. Kyiv Post. https://www.kyivpost.com/analysis/26992
