By David Neal,
Content Writer.
After months of delay, the New Zealand Defence Capability Plan 2025 was released on the 7th of April, to a fairly muted response. Media coverage focused on different aspects of the plan, with 1News highlighting the large naval and air components, as well as covering the levels of public support for increased defence spending (Day, 2025). Meanwhile, RNZ took a more critical approach, questioning who precisely we believe we need to be defended against, raising alarms about becoming involved in an “arms race”, or hand wringing about “killer drones” (Morning Report, 2025; Smith, 2025; Pennington, 2025). However, despite this media coverage, there has been little substantive discussion of the actual content of the plan, particularly regarding the proposed spending choices, and whether they will effectively meet the stated objectives.
This article will be the first in a series of explorations into the actual content of the Defence Capability Plan 2025: what the plan includes, what is missing, what it achieves, where it falls short, and what could be done instead. First I examine one of the long term decisions – what should be done about the Anzac-class frigates currently operated by the Royal New Zealand Navy?
The navy currently operates a pair of frigates, HMNZS Te Kaha and HMNZS Te Mana, small warships usually designed as general purpose vessels capable of most tasks. They were launched in 1995 and 1997 respectively. Both were purchased as part of a joint program with Australia, under which 10 ships were built from 1994 to 2004, with the first and fourth ships being purchased by New Zealand (Greener, 2009, pp. 43-46).
Fast forward to 2024-2025, and the ships in question are, unsurprisingly, very much showing their age. While they were upgraded in 2014, replacing most of their largely obsolete guns with Vertical Launch System tubes—a class of missile launcher—RNZN’s Anzacs were not equipped with their own anti-ship capability, instead opting for a system under which the ship carries a helicopter. That in turn, carries an anti-ship missile called the Penguin, with a range of around 34 kilometres and a 120 kilogram high-explosive warhead (Behind the Penguin Missile launch, 2025). This is the entire RNZN anti-ship capability (Felton, 2025).
So, what is the intent of the life extension program proposed in the Defence Capability Plan? It is just that, life extension as an end in itself, to maintain them until the early 2030s. The reasons given are reasonably sensible: preserving RNZN’s institutional experience at operating frigates, and preserving the navy’s current fighting capacity (New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 26).
The problem is that the ships themselves are already obsolete. The Royal Australian Navy decommissioned HMAS Anzac last year, and will decommission HMAS Arunta next year. They are to be replaced with Hunter-class frigates, a largely British design mounting 32 VLS cells (Royal Australian Navy, 2024), compared to the 20 on an RNZN Anzac-class each capable of firing either anti-air, or anti-ship missiles. This means that an Australian Hunter-class frigate would be able to defend the area around itself with as many missiles as an RNZN Anzac frigate, with 12 more launchers to spare.As an anti-ship weapon, they are to be armed with the Naval Strike Missile, an anti-ship missile with a range of approximately 185 kilometres (Molenda, 2018). The missile in a comparable role with the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the YJ-18, has a range of at least 220 kilometres (Missile Defence Project, 2024), and is a substantially larger missile than the Penguin. It is believed to be based on the Soviet 3M-54M1 Kalibr missile, which has a payload of 1,570 kilograms (Missile Defense Project, 2017), more than ten times that of the Penguin.
It appears then, that the Anzac-class frigates operated by the RNZN are simply ineffective compared to modern frigates, with an anti-ship capability dependent on the survival of a helicopter, and on being able to get that helicopter within 34 kilometres of a hostile warship in an age of missiles with ranges in the hundreds of kilometers. It seems unlikely that this program will succeed in its stated goal of preserving a fighting capability, given that capability is no longer present in relation to comparable ships in other forces.
Some may argue that perhaps it is simply too expensive to replace these ships at this time. That may be a reasonable objection, but ships take time to build. The Hunter-class acquisition program began in Australia with their 2009 Defence White Paper, calling for “a fleet of eight new Future Frigates, which will be larger than the Anzac-class vessels” (Australian Department Of Defence, 2009, p. 13). The ships in question were chosen in 2018 (Wroe, 2018), construction began last year (Naval News, 2024), and they are expected to enter service in the early 2030s. By that time, even with the life extension program, the RNZN’s Anzac-class frigates will have reached the end of their lives (New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 26).
Given the time and cost involved in building new frigates, it does not seem prudent to spend $300-$600 million to preserve already obsolete warships to a time when they will be even more obsolete and without a plan for replacement. While it will be expensive to replace them, that cost will have to be borne eventually. It is better to avoid spending hundreds of millions of dollars now to push the decision on spending yet more money down the road, with no long term plan for the inevitable replacements.
So what course should we take? The simplest would be to abandon frigates entirely, saving a great deal of money. This would, however, largely end any ability for New Zealand to be involved in the Pacific, and likely harm relations with our allies and partners through the region.If we intend to continue to operate frigates, then we need to take action now. Many of the cost overruns and delays in military procurement are caused by alterations demanded by the purchaser to a pre-existing design. These can be avoided by purchasing a design already being built, such as the Australian Hunter-class, the British Type 26 or Type 31, or the Franco-Italian FREMM.
The most obvious of these choices is the Hunter-class. At approximately AUD$45.6 billion for the 6 ship program (Australian National Audit Office, 2023), it is very expensive, costing several billion per-ship even if the per-unit price is reduced by increasing the size of the order. However it would fulfil the goal of interoperability with Australia laid out in the Defence Capability Plan (New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2025, p. 44) to the greatest degree possible. Additionally, military procurement is almost always part of a wider relationship, so perhaps the significant investment in an Australian project, and the payments to Australian shipyards, might be used for leverage in other negotiations with Australia.
The second option would be a British frigate design, either the Type 26, or the Type 31. The Type 26 is the basis of the Hunter-class, and is expected in service with the Royal Navy before 2030 (City Class, 2024). In addition to the RAN, a variant has also been adopted by the Royal Canadian Navy to be in service in the early 2030s (River-class destroyer (Canadian surface combatant), 2025). The Canadian program has a total estimated cost of CAD$22.2 billion (Allison, March 2025), approximately NZD$26.8 billion, for 15 ships (Government of Canada, 2025). This would also achieve the goal of interoperability, at a significantly lower cost than the Hunter-class itself.
Cheaper again would be the Type 31, another British design, with a price per unit of approximately £250 million, around NZD$555 million. These have been offered as an option to New Zealand before, with plans for at least partial manufacture in New Zealand. They have also been acquired by the Polish and Indonesian navies (Naval News, 2023), in addition to the Royal Navy. They are expected to have finished construction by early 2030 (Allison, January 2025). While not as advanced as the Type 26 variants, they are still modern frigates designed to be interoperable with the Type 26, thus also assisting with interoperability at a lower cost. In addition, the option of New Zealand contracts should make them a more attractive option to the New Zealand government. This would likely be the best choice for New Zealand, providing a modern replacement for the Anzac frigates, interoperability with our allies, and a price per unit that is achievable.
If New Zealand is to continue to operate frigates into the 2030s, it is essential that we take action now. Many of the cost overruns and delays in military procurement are caused by alterations demanded by the purchaser to a pre-existing design. These can be avoided by simply purchasing a design already being built, such as the three options explored above. While there is danger in the circular argument that ‘something must be done, therefore we must do it’, almost any other choice would be better than this life extension program.
References
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