Written by Dulmi de Silva
Introduction
The Pacific Islands have re-emerged as a key focus of twenty-first-century geopolitics. As China expands its influence across the region through aid, infrastructure, and security cooperation, the United States has renewed its engagement to counterbalance China’s presence. Central to this effort is the Pacific Partnership Strategy, which outlines a framework for deeper diplomatic, economic, and security ties with island nations. This article examines why the Pacific Islands matter to U.S. foreign policy, the risks of growing regional competition, and the often-overlooked strategic importance of New Zealand as a partner in the evolving regional order.
U.S. Foreign Policy in the Pacific
The United States considers itself an Indo-Pacific nation, due to its strategic interests and territorial presence (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). China remains one of its primary competitors under the second Trump administration, which is expected to prioritize great power competition. However, the U.S. does not yet maintain a consistent diplomatic presence across the Pacific Islands. The region comprises 14 island nations, served by only six U.S. embassies. These include the main embassy in Suva, Fiji, which accredits Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu, and a U.S. Consular Agency in French Polynesia (U.S. Embassy Suva, 2024). Plans are, however, also underway to open embassies in the Cook Islands and Niue (Jazeera, 2023).
During the Biden administration, several initiatives were introduced to revitalize U.S. partnerships in the Pacific (Edel & Paik, 2024). These included the U.S. Pacific Island Country Summit in 2022, where the White House released the first-ever Pacific Partnership Strategy, and the U.S.–Pacific Island Forum Leaders Summit in 2023 (Guillermo, 2025). In contrast, Trump-era engagement focuses on strategic powers, with less emphasis on smaller island nations (Aui’a Vaimaila Leatinu’u, 2025). Despite increased U.S. activity, Pacific leaders have voiced concerns that great power competition could result in militarization or strategic manipulation of the region (Keen & Tidwell, 2024). The case of the Solomon Islands, where security and development agreements with China led to national unrest, illustrates the complex dynamics at play.
Why the Pacific Islands Matter
The Pacific Islands, which proved strategically important during World War II, have become central to global power dynamics (Edel & Paik, 2024). Situated at the maritime crossroads linking the Americas to Asia, the region is increasingly a site of geopolitical contest between the United States and China (Making Our Rhetoric Real: U.S. Diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, 2025). The U.S. has recognized this shift and is taking steps to strengthen its presence before China secures deeper ties.
The potential for a Chinese military base in the region remains a serious concern, highlighted by the 2018 reports that Vanuatu might host a Chinese naval facility (Vasovic, n.d.). Such developments have far-reaching implications for regional security. China’s strategy combines economic assistance and soft power, offering long-term support to multilateral organizations such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF) (Vasovic, n.d.). Meanwhile, U.S.-China tensions often play out in coastal regions deemed critical by China for its national security, further exacerbating fears of conflict. The ongoing competition for influence contributes to a wider division between East and West.
Why New Zealand Matters to U.S. Strategy
New Zealand has consistently supported Pacific Island nations historically, geographically, and financially on climate change, sovereignty, and regional development. Partnering with New Zealand gives the U.S. greater legitimacy and diplomatic cover in the Pacific, particularly when Washington is seen as distant or opportunistic. New Zealand plays a significant role in disaster aid and climate response, with a foreign aid budget of $714 million, half of which is allocated to the Pacific Islands (Walters, 2019). The U.S. can align with or complement these efforts through programs like USAID and the Peace Corps to present a collaborative, less militarized approach (Making Our Rhetoric Real: U.S. Diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, 2025).
New Zealand’s contributions extend beyond aid. We are a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (alongside the U.S., UK, Canada, and Australia), which provides valuable security insight. Although not a part of the AUKUS agreement, New Zealand’s proximity and naval access are strategically significant as the Pacific increasingly becomes a geopolitical flashpoint. In the event of U.S.-China tensions escalating, New Zealand’s cooperation could influence logistics, surveillance, and allied coordination in the South Pacific (Edel & Paik, 2024).
In addition, New Zealand wields considerable soft power through its presence in regional forums such as the Pacific Islands Forum, the MSG (as an observer), and the NATO Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) summit (Edel & Paik, 2024). Its influence helps shape how Pacific nations perceive and respond to U.S. and Chinese engagement. This makes New Zealand a strategic partner and a mediator capable of easing tensions and fostering regional trust.
Conclusion
New Zealand holds a unique dual position in the Pacific, where diplomacy is shaped as much by cultural and historical ties as formal alliances. It bridges the gap between Pacific priorities and Western interests. By aligning with New Zealand’s regionally grounded initiatives, the United States can enhance its credibility, reduce fears of overreach, and build a foreign policy approach that is proactive rather than reactive.
As the Pacific becomes a key arena in 21st-century geopolitics, the United States must choose whether to view the region through militarized competition or as a community of equal partners working toward shared resilience and development. New Zealand offers a clear pathway toward the latter. Ultimately, the U.S. must recognize that long-term success in the Pacific depends less on military dominance and more on sustainable partnerships rooted in trust, climate action, and regional sovereignty. New Zealand is a key ally in that mission.
References
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Edel, C., & Paik, K. (2024). Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific in a New U.S. Administration. Csis.org. https://www.csis.org/analysis/australia-new-zealand-and-pacific-new-us administration
Guillermo. (2025). Pacific Island Affairs and US Diplomatic Relations – Foreign Policy Research Institute. Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/01/pacific-island-affairs-and-us-diplomatic-relations/
Jazeera, A. (2023, September 25). The US is to open embassies in the Cook Islands and Niue. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/25/us-to-open-embassies-in-the-cook-islands-Niue
Keen, M., & Tidwell, A. (2024, January 31). Geopolitics in the Pacific Islands: Playing for advantage | Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/geopolitics-pacific-islands-playing-advantage
Making Our Rhetoric Real: U.S. Diplomacy in the Pacific Islands. (2025). Afsa.org. https://afsa.org/making-our-rhetoric-real-us-diplomacy-pacific-islands
U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Indo-Pacific Strategy. United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/indo-pacific-strategy/
U.S. Embassy Suva. (2024, January 15). U.S. Embassy in Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu. https://fj.usembassy.gov/u-s-embassy-suva/
Walters, L. (2019, April 23). NZ plans for inevitable climate-related migration. Newsroom. https://newsroom.co.nz/2019/04/23/nz-planning-for-inevitable-climate-related-migration/
